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Abstract 
The long-lasting consensus Europe is a side- or even a non-issue in the public discourse has been 
challenged. Europe and European issues have gained attention. However, little research analyzed who 
drives this EU attention – the media or parties – what the optimal time lags for these influences are 
and, finally, how cross-national variations in these media–party interactions can be explained. To 
answer those questions, we rely on quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles and party press 
releases in seven countries (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the 
United Kingdom) during the twelve weeks prior to the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election. Our 
results from daily-level vector autoregression (VAR) analysis shows parties are the main driver and 
the influence occurs in most countries within a short timeframe of one day. However, our findings 
also indicate elite’s opinion polarization and elite’s EU salience cannot fully explain cross-national 
variations.  
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Since the 1990s, European integration as an elite-driven project has been increasingly politically 
contested (Hooghe and Marks 2008). The existent but so far quiescent differences in citizens’ 
attitudes towards European integration (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004: 32) have gradually been 
taken up by parties. Accordingly, political communication about the European Union (EU) has 
changed. Especially in times of European Parliament (EP) elections, not only media increases its 
coverage about the EU in terms of both “visibility and Europeaness” (Schuck et al. 2011: 50) but also 
parties attach higher salience to EU issues (Adam et al. 2017a; Adam and Maier 2011; 2016). Yet, 
few studies have focused on who drives this EU attention – either media or parties.  
Research that focuses on party–media agenda-setting, i.e., the driving forces of issue attention, within 
a national context is abundant (Bartels 1996; Brandenburg 2002; Hopmann et al. 2012; Soroka 2002b; 
Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). These studies show parties are the main agenda-setters, at least during 
national election times. The media play a more important role in routine times of politics. While the 
literature has mainly dealt with specific conditions under which either the media or parties prevail, 
few studies have paid attention to the reaction times (or lags) it takes the media to influence parties, 
and vice versa. Moreover, research at the EU level is missing. We address these gaps by exploring 
the interdependencies between the parties’ and the media’s agenda within the EP election context in 
seven Western European countries. We thereby ask whether the media or party agenda is the main 
driver of EU attention. By answering this question, we assess if findings from the national context 
can be adopted by the EU as well. We further focus on the reaction times between media and party 
communication as we assume party communication and media coverage affect each other over the 
course of the election campaign. Our second research question, therefore, asks which time lag best 
describes this mutual influence and whether reaction times of media and parties differ.  
Our European perspective, especially the focus on the EP election, also offers new opportunities for 
agenda-setting research. So far, scholars have usually focused on one or two countries, using 
 
 
additional countries as robustness checks and hardly conducted comparative studies (Van Aelst and 
Walgrave 2011). We investigate whether the interdependencies between the media and party agenda 
are uniform across countries, or whether we find systematic differences, and, if so, how we can 
explain them. In the EP election context, we start with two explanatory factors that could intensify 
the influence of the party on the media agenda, namely a country’s elite polarization on EU integration 
and the elite’s attention to European issues. Both factors are central for contestation about Europe an 
provide a convenient input for the media to follow EU issues put forward by parties. Our last research 
question addresses how exogenous factors affect the agenda-setting processes between media and 
parties and account for cross-national variation.  
To answer these questions, we rely on a quantitative content analysis of news articles and party press 
releases (PRs) in seven countries published during the twelve weeks prior to the EP election 2014. 
We use vector autoregression (VAR) models to capture the interdependencies between party 
communication and media coverage. This approach allows us to estimate the causal impact of the 
party on the media agenda, and vice versa, to identify typical reaction times for these influences, and, 
finally, to compare the findings between countries. 
 
Theoretical considerations 
A main assumption in agenda-setting research is media coverage raises public awareness to issues, 
i.e., the more often an issue is covered in the media, the more salient this issue is for the public (Shaw 
and McCombs 1977). However, the media not only influences the public but also political actors, 
more specifically the salience they attach to issues (Lee 2014; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016). 
Political actors need the media to connect with their voters. Therefore, they react to the agenda set by 
the media (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016). As they “have professionalized their approach toward the 
media […], they increasingly adhere to a media logic when communicating to the electorate” 
 
 
(Hopmann et al. 2009: 73; Strömbäck et al. 2011). In other words, political parties are susceptible to 
issues that are salient in the media (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; Soroka 2003; Thesen 2013). 
As previous research shows, the agenda-setting power of the media on political actors in routine times 
of politics is quite sizeable (for an overview see Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016).  
But, research indicates the agenda-setting power of the media declines before elections. In times of 
election campaigns, political parties are more important compared to media for promoting issues on 
the agenda (Dalton et al. 1998; Eichhorn 1996 / 2005; Semetko et al. 1991). According to Walgrave 
and Aelst (2006), political actors behave differently as they want to convince voters and be 
accordingly covered in the media. Indeed, national election studies clearly show, in campaign times, 
parties are especially successful in putting their issues on the agenda (Brandenburg 2002: 46; 
Hopmann et al. 2012: 184; Norris et al. 1999; Roberts and McCombs 1994: 260; Semetko et al. 1991).  
However, agenda-setting research on the EU is lacking and it is not yet clear whether the above-
mentioned findings can be transferred to a European election context. On the one hand, the only study 
we know that deals with the EU suggests media is the main driver. Maier et al. (2017) find media are 
more likely than parties to put an issue on the agenda, and to initiate the debate about the EU, at least 
when the trajectories and recurring patterns of specific issues, e.g., immigration, are traced. This 
might be the result of media-party agenda-setting, i.e., political actors react to specific news stories, 
and inter-media agenda-setting, as other media outlets take up a specific story leading to convergence 
in news coverage (Harder et al. 2017; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2008). But Maier et al. (2017) do 
not analyze whether the overall media agenda also prevails in driving the party agenda, i.e., when all 
EU issues raised during the election campaign are considered. In this paper, we are not interested in 
the precise interplay of single EU issues between media (outlets) and individual parties but, rather, in 
line with traditional agenda-setting research in the interplay between the overall media and party 
agenda.  
 
 
On the other hand, one could argue in favor of the party-media impact. The same agenda-setting 
mechanisms pursued by political parties and found in a national context could pertain, or even be 
more pronounced, in a European context for at least two reasons. First, since the EU on its own has 
little news value (Statham 2008), it needs to be promoted by political actors, such as parties or 
candidates, to be visible (Adam 2007; De Vreese 2003; Jalali and Silva 2011; Machill et al. 2006; 
Schuck and De Vreese 2011). Second, the introduction of the “Spitzenkandidaten” for the presidency 
of the European Commission (Van der Brug et al. 2016) personalized the 2014 EP election and led 
to a party-driven rise in media attention (Schulze 2016). Consequently, we state in our first 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: The party agenda is the main driver of the media agenda in the 2014 EP election campaign. 
 
We now move from the interdependencies between media and party agenda to the reaction time 
needed for one agenda to mirror changes in the other. Empirical research on reaction times is quite 
rare, even after the pioneering article by Bartels (1996). Inter-media agenda-setting research finds 
media outlets tend to react, on a daily basis, to changes in the overall media agenda (Golan 2006; 
Harder et al. 2017; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2008). Typically, time lags range between one and 
two days. Especially, print media must react on a daily basis to new stories, events, and issues put 
forward by both political actors and other outlets due to the inherent “competition for audience“ 
(Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2008: 861). This is even more the case in times of nearly instant online 
communication (Harder et al. 2017). This logic of competition can also be applied to the European 
context. Thus, we state the media’s reactions should be fast in addressing shifts in attention to EU 
issues. 
 
 
 
H2a: The influence of parties on the media agenda occurs within one day 
 
Agenda-setting research that focuses on interdependencies between political actors and media outlets 
shows circular effects occur within up to seven days (Bartels 1996). The reaction times of political 
actors to the media, especially in campaign times, is subject to a different logic of communication. 
On the one hand, campaign strategists are quick to follow events and media hypes (Elmelund-
Praestekaer and Wien 2008). From a technical standpoint of strategic communication, parties could 
use strategic issue management to even anticipate issues and events in a campaign and react 
accordingly when these issues are raised in the media. On the other hand, they could also choose to 
be more reserved and bound to their own agenda and choose not to react to upcoming issues in the 
media (Seethaler and Melischek 2012), if it serves their campaign strategy narrative. Campaigns are 
meticulously planned in terms of issue-salience and issue-positions (Kleinnijenhuis and Nooy 2013) 
with professional spin doctors adding to strategic communication (Hopmann et al. 2009) over the 
course of a campaign. Based on our argumentation so far, i.e., the party agenda as the main driver, 
we think the second argument is more convincing, i.e., parties try to hold to their campaign strategy 
and issue agenda and are more reluctant to immediately react to media hypes and upcoming issues. 
Consequently, we would expect no influence of the media on the party agenda in the first place. 
However, in cases in which the media agenda has an impact on the party agenda, we expect the 
reaction times to be delayed as parties might aim to bring responses to the media in line with their 
campaign narrative. Our respective hypothesis is:  
 
H2b: The influence of media on the party agenda takes longer than one day.  
 
Explaining cross-national variations in the interdependencies between the media and party agenda 
 
 
According to Walgrave and Aelst (2016), agenda-setting research, so far, has mostly neglected the 
comparative perspective between countries or used a multi-country design as mere robustness checks. 
As a result, few agenda-setting studies have focused on determinants that systematically explain 
cross-national variations in media-party-interactions (for an exception, see Vliegenthart et al. 2016). 
The focus on communication about Europe within the EP election setting provides a good opportunity 
to compare interdependencies in agenda-setting among countries as various countries hold the same 
election and allow for controlling for idiosyncrasies and different timing of national elections. 
Since we expect parties to be the main agenda-setter in the EP election, we choose explanatory factors 
that reflect the intensity of contestation and importance of Europe for a country’s political elite., i.e., 
the elite’s polarization and elite’s EU salience. First, the degree of elite polarization on EU issues 
could play a central role as a “catalyst” affecting the relation between the party and the media agenda. 
Following Gerhards (1993), the absence of conflict, more precisely party contestation and polarized 
opinions, is the main reason why the media paid little attention to the European integration, at least 
until the 1990s. In brief, EU issues simply lacked newsworthiness. However, the polarization of 
European integration at the national level has increased (Hutter et al. 2016) in the meantime for 
different reasons, such as the transfer of authority to the European level, constitutional reforms and 
new treaties, and the enlargement of the EU (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2008). When elite opinions are 
polarized within a country, Europe adheres to the news value of conflict and media should be more 
likely to pick it up. Consequently, we would expect a party-driven interaction leading to the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H3a: The more polarized elite opinions with regard to EU integration within a country, the more 
agenda-setting is driven by parties. 
 
 
 
Second, the importance the elite devote to EU issues in their party communication, and salience, 
could further moderate the media-party-interactions. Research indicates the sheer extent of party 
communication matters. For instance, parties that communicate their issues more often have a higher 
chance to get into the media (e.g., on populist communication, see Schmidt 2017). However, the EP 
election setting is exceptional as national parties might further choose whether to address an issue at 
the national level or the EU level. Since the media does not only cover issues related to the EU but 
also domestic issues, the relative salience parties devote to EU issues could moderate the impact of 
the party on the media agenda. The more often a party addresses the EU in its party communication, 
the higher the probability of influencing the media. Of course, this effect depends not only on the 
party communication of one specific party but also a country’s aggregated party communication. We 
expect:  
 
H3b: The higher the elite’s attention to issues with a European reference within a country, the more 
the agenda-setting process on such issues is driven by parties. 
 
Data and Methods 
This study focuses on media and party communication twelve weeks before the 2014 EP election. 
The EP election provides an extraordinary setting as it allows us to analyze not only whether findings 
from national contexts can be applied to the European context but also whether we find systematic 
cross-country variations in the same election context. We chose seven countries, namely Austria, 
France, Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom that vary concerning 
our main country-level determinants, namely elite polarization and elite attention to EU issues. 
We rely on a quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles and party press releases. A common 
approach is to combine different communication channels to analyze the interdependencies between 
 
 
the media and party agenda (Bartels 1996; Neuman et al. 2014; Vliegenthart and Montes 2014). While 
it is common to measure the media agenda based on news articles, we opted for press releases to 
measure party communication for two reasons: first, they are specifically targeted at the media and, 
second, they are not published on fixed schedules (e.g., parliamentary questionings), but potentially 
on a daily basis and better suited to capture reactions to external events or issues published in media 
(for a detailed discussion, see Maier et al. 2017). The selection of relevant articles and press releases 
is based on a search string containing at least two EU-related key words.1  
For the media agenda, we coded, for each country, all EU-related articles on the front page, political 
section, and commentaries published in one left-leaning and one right-leaning national newspaper, 
rotating them on a daily base. Up to three political actors, i.e., actors who formulate statements or 
perform an action and make a political opinion visible concerning a specific issue were coded per 
article. For the party agenda, we coded the EU-related press releases of national parties that achieved 
more than 3% of votes in the last national or 2009 EP election. The reliability scores, here 
Krippendorff’s alpha, ranges between 0.76 to 1.00 for both sources (see Maier et al. 2016 for details 
concerning codebook, training, and reliability).  
Our analysis is based on two-time series with data available at the daily level, one related to press 
releases and the other to political actors in the news. These time series allow us to capture “the 
[interdependent] dynamics of attention to issues over time” (Neuman et al. 2014: 198). For both 
agendas, we rely on information about the EU on an aggregated level, in terms of both actors and 
issues. In a nutshell, our data contains EU issues put forward in press releases and news on a given 
day per country.2  
 
The independent variables at the country-level are measured as follows. First, we operationalize elite 
opinion polarization as the range between the two most extreme positions towards EU integration 
 
 
taken by parties (for details, see Adam et al. 2017b: 8). The EU position is measured by an index, 
which accounts for all evaluations (positive, negative, and balanced) that a party directs in their press 
releases at concrete EU policies and EU actors as well as the general and fundamental idea of 
European integration, giving more weight to the latter. The index ranges between -1 (EU opposition) 
and +1 (EU support). Using the absolute difference between the most extreme party EU positions per 
country, elite opinion polarization ranges between 0 (no polarization) and 2 (high polarization). 
Second, elite’s attention to EU issues is measured by the number of EU-related press releases in 
proportion to all published press releases by a party (see also Adam et al. 2017a).  
In our sample, cross-national variations can be observed regarding both indicators. The highest 
opinion polarization can be found in the United Kingdom (1.2), followed by France (1.0) and the 
Netherlands (1.0). Countries such as Austria (0.8), Greece, and Germany (both 0.7) are in the middle. 
At the other extreme is Portugal, where elite polarization is hardly present (0.3). By contrast, elite’s 
attention to EU issues is extraordinary high in Portugal with 56% of all press releases referring to the 
EU. Parties attach lower salience to the EU in Austria (34%), the Netherlands (32%), France (30%), 
and Greece (29%). Elite’s EU attention is lowest in Germany (26%) and the UK (25%). The 
correlation between these two indicators is negative and relatively high (Pearson’s r = -0.76). 
 
Methods for analysis 
We use vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis to assess the interdependencies between the media and 
party agenda, the temporal influences (i.e., time lags) and country variations. VAR models have 
gained importance in agenda-setting research recently (Bartels 1996; Lee 2014; Lee et al. 2016; 
Neuman et al. 2014; Soroka 2002a; Vliegenthart and Montes 2014). The advantages of VAR analysis 
are threefold. First, this method allows capturing the causality structure concerning the attention to 
EU issues in party communication and media. A key feature of VAR analysis is indeed the possibility 
 
 
to “directly tackle the chicken and egg problem by assessing the chronological sequence between 
media coverage and political action” (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2011: 309-307, see also Neuman et 
al. 2014). Second, VAR analysis allows identifying potential time lags regarding the impact of party 
communication on media coverage, and vice versa. Third, VAR analysis is especially suited to 
account for interdependencies between both forms of communication in a single model as this method 
“treats the links across units in an unrestricted fashion” (Canova and Ciccarelli 2013: 207). In other 
words, VAR analysis treats all variables “as a priori endogenous” (Lütkepohl 2009: 281), meaning 
both party and media can influence each other in the same model and allows exploration of mutual 
influences in time series.  
Our VAR analysis follows the common approach in the literature (e.g., Vliegenthart and Montes 
2014) First, we test the main assumptions, such as stationarity and residual autocorrelation, and 
identify optimal time lags. Then, we proceed with a causal analysis using the Granger causality tests 
to detect whether and, if so, who follows whom in media-party-interactions. Finally, we investigate 
cumulative impulse response functions (CIRF) and forecast error vector decomposition (FEVD) to 
assess the direction and size of the influence (Becketti 2013; Lütkepohl 2009; Neuman et al. 2014: 
203–4; Vliegenthart and Montes 2014: 328). More precisely, we check in a first step whether the 
main requirements for VAR analysis are given before conducting the VARs. A necessary criterion is 
that the data is stationary, i.e., the mean, variance, and autocorrelation of a variable should be constant 
over time.3 We examine this using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (for details, see, Lee et al. 2016: 
448–49; Vliegenthart and Montes 2014: 328).4 We then assess the lag structure, i.e., how many days 
are needed for the influence to occur and select the optimal lags using two information criteria, 
namely the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion 
(HQIC). Although the former is usually used in agenda-setting studies (e.g. Lee 2014; Vliegenthart 
and Montes 2014), it tends to overestimate the number of lags (see Lütkepohl 2005: 148–50). 
 
 
Therefore, we use the HQIC as a second reference.5 We further test for residual autocorrelation using 
the Lagrange-multiplier test ex-post (see also, Becketti 2013: 313).  
In a second step, we run VARs and then perform the Granger causality tests. One variable is said to 
cause a second variable if it improves the prediction of the second variable once its own past is 
considered (Granger 1969; Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; Lütkepohl 2005; 2009; Neuman et 
al. 2014; Vliegenthart and Montes 2014). As Granger causality chi-square tests only give insights as 
to whether the effect is significant or not, we further rely on cumulative impulse response functions 
(CIRFs) to assess the direction and forecast error vector decompositions (FEVDs) to capture the size 
of the influence, i.e., the part of variation of one variable which is caused by shocks (or lags) of 
another variable (Becketti 2013; Vliegenthart and Montes 2014). The estimation of CIRFs and 
FEVDs requires an understanding of the order of the variables since it matters which variable is added 
first (Becketti 2013; Sims 1980). Therefore, a sound theoretical argument should be made if a specific 
order is chosen in a structural recursive VAR (Lütkepohl 2009: 310–11). Although we assume parties 
influence the media, we controlled for influence the other way around to address the additional 
influence of parties after taking the past of media into account and calculate the VAR models for both 
causal directions. Therefore, there is a model for every country with media as a dependent variable 
(added first), PR added in second, and the other way around. When testing for direction and size of 
effects, e.g., of the party agenda on the media agenda, we add the dependent variable, here the media 
agenda, first to assess the remaining influence of the second (or independent) variable.6  
 
Results 
Starting with the description of our data, Figure 1 shows the trends in attention to EU issues in the 
run-up to the 2014 EP election in the seven countries. We look at the absolute numbers of press 
releases and political actors mentioned in news articles who refer to EU issues. We can summarize 
 
 
two main findings as follows. First, references to EU issues that are across countries are, on average, 
more often present in the media as compared to press releases (also see descriptive statistics in 
appendix 2).7 The exception is Austria, where the number of press releases exceeds the number of 
EU issues in the media.8 Second, no constant trend towards the election day can be detected, but, 
rather, variations between countries. There is evidence for a slightly increasing trend in France and 
Portugal regarding party and media communication in contrast to the United Kingdom and Greece 
where either the media or party communication decreases. The next section tests whether systematic 
patterns between party communication and media coverage can be found.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Overall interdependencies between party and media agenda 
Our core interest is to disentangle the interdependencies between the party and media agenda. More 
specifically we focus on who influences whom, the lag after which this influence takes place and, 
finally, whether cross-national differences can be observed, and, if so, explained. In Table 1 the 
results from the VAR analysis based on all EU issues are presented for each country separately. As 
mentioned above, a main assumption of VAR analysis is the variables are endogenous and related to 
each other. For this reason, each VAR model contains just as much regressions as variables are 
included. In our case, two regressions, the first includes PRs as a dependent (or in VAR terms 
response) variable (see left-hand side of Table 1), the second are political actors mentioned in the 
media (see right-hand side). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
 
The results in Table 1 support our first hypothesis that the overall party agenda is the main driver of 
media-party-interactions when all EU issues are considered. The Granger causality tests show for 
each country that press releases have a significant influence on the EU attention in the media, rather 
than the other way around. Table 1 provides further information on the lag selected in each country 
model. Therefore, we can assess our second hypothesis about the time length within which the media-
party-interaction occur. As mentioned in the methodological section, the optimal lag structure was 
identified ex-ante before running our VAR models together with a test of the main assumptions. The 
second column in Table 1 suggests the optimal lag in most countries is one day and rather immediate. 
Both information criteria used for the lag selection, the AIC and HQIC, propose a lag of one day.9 
This means the VAR models are best specified if the lag of one day is chosen. This lag-specific 
finding, combined with the previously discussed VAR results, supports our hypothesis 2a; the 
influence of the party on the media agenda is quite fast during campaign times. In other words, if the 
media agenda is influenced by the party agenda, it is the amount of press releases containing EU-
references published the day before that matters. Only Austria is an exception with a proposed lag 
structure of two days.10 But, the inspection of the CIRF figures indicates the influence still occurs 
within a short period; the effect decreases considerably after two days, 0.24 additional mentioning in 
the media, and after three days, 0.06 additional media mentioning (see also CIRF figure 2). The 
evidence points that the party-media impact is also rather fast, within up to two days.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Turning to Germany, the lag structure is ambiguous, resulting in two possible models including a 
one-day and a three-day lag.11 We present the results for both VAR models. As discussed above, the 
findings for the German one-day model show the party agenda is the driver of the media agenda. This 
 
 
is also the case for the three-day model. However, the results further suggest the media also affects 
the amount of press releases (see Granger-cause test on the left-hand side of Table 1). Yet, the 
influence is smaller as compared to the reverse party agenda influence and no significant variation in 
the party agenda can be attributed to lags of the media agenda, as the FEVD values show. These 
findings, provide only scant support for our hypothesis 2b: if the media influences the party agenda, 
longer time lags than one day should be considered. 
Comparing the CIRF and FEVD values across countries allows a better understanding of the direction 
and size of the party-media-interaction. As Table 1 shows, the more press releases are published in 
the past, the more often EU references appear in the media. In Austria, for example, an additional 
press release results in 0.49 additional mentioning of the EU in the media after two days (see also 
figure 2). However, the influences are not uniform across countries, as differences in the CIRF and 
FEVD in Table 1 indicate. Moreover, two country groups can be distinguished. The first country 
group includes Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Austria, where all CIRFs values, even after eight 
days, as well as the FEVD at the selected lag are significant. FEVD accounts for the amount of 
remaining variation in the media agenda after having considered its own past, that is explained by the 
party agenda. The party agenda has the highest explanatory potential in the UK (24.1% after one day), 
followed by Austria (19.4% after two days) and Portugal (14.2% after one day). For the second 
country group, namely, France, Germany (model with 1-day lag), Greece, and the Netherlands, we 
cannot attribute any significant variation in the media agenda to the party agenda, even though the 
CIRF values point to a positive, but admittedly small influence of the party agenda on the media 
agenda.  
So far, we have not only seen the party agenda influences the media agenda in a short time but also 
this influence varies between countries, being stronger in some countries as compared to others. We 
move forward to explain these differences by the degree of elite opinion polarization (H3a) and the 
 
 
role of EU salience in party communication, i.e., parties’ attention to EU issues as compared to non-
EU issues (H3b). Table 2 gives an insight into how each country-level variable might be related to 
the interdependencies between the party and the media agenda. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The findings in table 2 indicate there is no linear trend. Neither differences in elite opinion 
polarization (H3a) nor parties’ attention to EU issues (H3b) are systematically related to the influence 
of the party on the media agenda. However, we find the most extreme cases (regarding elite opinion 
polarization: the UK; regarding EU saliences: Portugal) are among those countries where the 
influence of the party on media agenda is substantial. The latter factor could also explain the case of 
Austria, the country with the second largest EU attention in party communication. Nevertheless, our 
hypotheses 3a and 3b fall short to explain the case of Germany. In addition, we cannot rule out 
whether it is the elite opinion polarization, parties’ EU attention, or an inverse combination of both 
(i.e., high polarization combined with low EU salience, and vice versa) that is associated with the 
influence of the party on the media agenda. Despite the empirical support, at least for the UK and 
Portugal, we have to reject our hypotheses that elite polarization (H3a) or parties’ EU salience (H3b) 
can fully explain cross-national variations.  
 
Discussion 
Our findings confirm previous research in national settings; parties are the main drivers of the agenda 
in times of election campaigns. The implications of the transferability of the results from the national 
to the EU context is actually good news for the EU and European integration, as this shows a trend 
towards normalization of EU-related political communication.  
 
 
The best time lag to describe the mutual influences between party and media agenda is one day, yet 
keeping in mind this mainly stems from the media following party communication. These findings 
are again in line with previous research in national settings. Longer time lags can only be found for 
Germany where the media also influence the party agenda.  
The German case could indicate not all parties react in the same way, but rather adopt different 
communication strategies, leading to our inconclusive results. At least three possible forms of parties’ 
campaign strategies could be distinguished. First, in some cases, a party might choose to react 
instantaneously due to strategic issue management and to make the front page, resulting in mutual 
influence between parties and media. For this case, however, we do not find empirical evidence. 
Second, parties could decide to ignore upcoming issues in the media and stick to their planned 
campaign strategy, resulting in no reaction to the media at all. This campaign strategy is in line with 
the results for the other countries. Third, parties could be reluctant to media hypes and upcoming 
issues, but nevertheless react to them through positioning themselves in line with their campaign 
narrative, resulting in longer reaction times. This is what we find for Germany. When longer time 
lags are considered, the media also influence the party agenda. Further research at the party level is 
needed to provide a conclusive answer as to whether parties within a country apply different campaign 
strategies. 
Our last research question aimed to explain variation between countries, in our case where the 
influence of the party agenda on the media agenda is more and less substantial, i.e., UK, Austria, 
Germany (3-day lag), and Portugal as compared to France, the Netherlands, Germany (1-day lag), 
and Greece. We focused on elite polarization and parties’ EU salience as explanatory factors, which 
had no linear impact. Moreover, our results indicate combinations could matter. For example, parties’ 
influence is quite high in the strongly polarized UK, although parties tend to avoid EU issues in their 
campaigns. By contrast, despite low levels of polarization, parties in Portugal’s electoral campaign 
 
 
heavily relies on EU issues. Austria has elements of both elite conflict and parties’ EU salience, 
together with exceptionally intense party communication in general. In the absence (or presence) of 
polarization, parties might benefit from publishing a great number of PRs (or rarely communicating). 
Our findings indicate that instead of a “one-size fits all” solution, such as elite polarization or EU 
salience, combinations of factors, also beyond those we have studied, have to be taken into account.  
Based on the findings and limitations of this study, there are different areas for further research. First, 
future studies could have a stronger focus on explaining under which conditions the media might 
influence the party agenda. In this paper, we have aggregated all EU-related issues and focused on 
the EP election campaign period. However, research in national settings shows the media might be 
more important, and the driver, if specific issues, such as foreign politics or politics in routine times 
are considered (e.g., Soroka 2003; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). 
Second, further research is needed to explain cross-national variations. Our findings show the 
influence of the party on the media agenda was not uniform across countries in the 2014 EP election. 
These findings might be applicable to national election contexts. Therefore, agenda-setting research, 
in general, should deal with explaining why agenda-setting power varies among countries more 
intensively. In this paper, we tested the role of the party elite. However, none of our explanatory 
factors, neither elite polarization nor the elite’s EU attention, can satisfactorily explain differences 
between countries. One next effort could be to scrutinize actor- or party-centered factors. This could 
be either pursued by looking at factors at the country-level, as we have started to do, or to move to 
the party-level. Explanations could not only focus on parties’ communication strategies, as mentioned 
above, reacting to the media as well as to other parties but also on specific party characteristics, such 
as positions towards and internal party consensus on European integration. In sum, we find the media 
agenda follows party communication in the 2014 EP election campaign straightaway. However, there 
are differences between countries that cannot be explained by a country’s elite opinion polarization 
 
 
and overall parties’ EU salience. Thus, future agenda-setting research needs to address why the 
interdependencies between the media and parties vary. 
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Figure 1: Trends of EU issue salience in the party and media agenda 
 
 
 
Table 1: Interdependencies between the party and media agenda 
Dependent: 
 
party agenda media agenda 
County Lag Granger
-chi2 
CIRF FEVD and 
CI-bounds 
(95%) 
N Granger-
chi2 
CIRF FEVD and CI-
bounds (95%) 
N 
Austria 2 .054 ‒ .001 n.s. 673 22.002*** .490 .194 .045 .342 487 
France 1 1.405 ‒ .013 n.s. 157 4.548* .694 .043 n.s. 
 
699 
Germany 1 .559 ‒ .006 n.s. 257 11.442** .773 .118 n.s. 
 
675 
Germany  3 9.456* ‒ .036 n.s. 257 18.845*** .730 
(n.s.) 
.151 .019 .283 675 
Greece 1 .737 ‒ .007 n.s. 331 4.575* .424 .047 n.s. 
 
506 
Netherlands 1 .140 ‒ .002 n.s. 156 4.798* .564 .054 n.s. 
 
445 
Portugal 1 2.374 ‒ .022 n.s. 204 15.167*** 1.170 .142 .009 .274 876 
UK 1 .150 ‒ .001 n.s. 193 26.782*** .934 .241 .080 .402 368 
Notes: Results are displayed for the influences by the additional variable on the dependent with ***=p<.001. **=p<.01. *=p<.05 for the chi2 sig. CIRF 
only reported if CI-bounds do not cross 0 (highlighted bold). Values for CIRF and FEVD’s are dependent on the order of adding variables to the model. 
Thus, values in both columns represent the influence of adding the independent variable last. In addition, FEVD cannot be computed for 1-day lags 
since the dependent variable has an influence of 1 due to input ordering. In this case, additional effects of the lag+1 day (i.e., 2 days) are shown. 
Reading example Austria from left to right: For a 2-day lag, the Granger causality test is non-significant (.054). So, adding Media does not improve 
forecasting and the CIRF and FEVD (.007) reflect that by its CI-Bounds crossing 0. With a 2-day lag for PR influencing Media the Granger causality 
chi2 (22.002***) indicates PR improves the forecasts of media. After two days, an additional PR results in .490 mentions (CIRF) in News articles. For 
one random shock in PR 19.4% (FEVD .194) variation in media can be attributed (the borders of the confidence interval bounds should not cross zero 
to be significant at the 95% level; significant results are highlighted bold). Please note the results above stem from single VAR models for different 
countries with different total N. Thus, CIRFs values are only comparable within countries. 
Source: Own data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The role of elite polarization and EU salience for explaining the interdependencies between the party and media agenda 
Dependent:   party agenda media agenda  
Elite 
Pol. 
(H3a) 
County Lag Granger-
chi2 
CIRF FEVD and CI-
bounds (95%) 
N Granger-
chi2 
CIRF FEVD and CI-
bounds (95%) 
N EU sal. 
(H3b) 
1.2 UK 1 .150 ‒ .001 n.s. 193 26.782*** .934 .241 .080 .402 368 0.25 
1.0 France 1 1.405 ‒ .013 n.s. 
 
157 4.548* .694 .043 n.s. 699 0.30 
1.0 Netherlands 1 .140 ‒ .002 n.s. 
 
156 4.798* .564 .054 n.s. 445 0.32 
0.8 Austria 2 .054 ‒ .001 n.s. 
 
673 22.002*** .490 .194 .045 .342 0.34 0.25 
0.7 Germany 1 .559 ‒ .006 n.s. 
 
257 11.442** .773 .118 n.s. 675 0.26 
0.7 Germany  3 9.456* ‒ .036 n.s. 
 
257 18.845*** .730 (n.s.) .151 .019 .283 0.26 0.34 
0.7 Greece 1 .737 ‒ .007 n.s. 
 
331 4.575* .424 .047 n.s. 506 0.29 
0.3 Portugal 1 2.374 ‒ .022 n.s.   204 15.167*** 1.170 .142 .009 .274 0.56 0.29 
Notes: ***=p<.001. **=p<.01. *=p<.05; Elite Pol = Elite polarization, EU sal. = EU salience, for further information, see table 1. 
Source: Own data. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Overview of EU issues in press releases and the media 
  AT FR DE GR NL PT UK 
Issues (PRs and 
political actors in 
media articles) 
PR Media Total PR Media Total PR Media Total PR Media Total PR Media Total PR Media Total PR Media Total 
Economy 
145 99 244 21% 73 178 251 29% 63 94 157 17% 151 199 350 42% 31 55 86 14% 111 442 553 51% 22 23 45 8% 
Social and Labor 
Market Policy 
78 22 100 9% 11 9 20 2% 12 16 28 3% 51 28 79 9% 13 11 24 4% 47 81 128 12% 13 9 22 4% 
Education and 
Research 
11 4 15 1% 0 3 3 0% 5 2 7 1% 5 2 7 1% 0 6 6 1% 3 30 33 3% 3 1 4 1% 
Law and Order 
46 31 77 7% 7 17 24 3% 24 52 76 8% 2 3 5 1% 11 31 42 7% 3 30 33 3% 7 18 25 4% 
Immigration 
32 31 63 5% 7 56 63 7% 17 26 43 5% 8 26 34 4% 7 35 42 7% 2 22 24 2% 24 46 70 12% 
International Affairs 
56 172 228 20% 11 241 252 29% 50 295 345 37% 21 105 126 15% 12 120 132 22% 1 110 111 10% 23 97 120 21% 
Culture and Other 
25 3 28 2% 2 6 8 1% 5 9 14 2% 10 5 15 2% 2 5 7 1% 5 9 14 1% 1 2 3 1% 
Environment and 
Energy 
60 21 81 7% 8 9 17 2% 17 25 42 5% 16 24 40 5% 13 22 35 6% 7 12 19 2% 12 17 29 5% 
Infrastructure 
26 7 33 3% 1 4 5 1% 7 13 20 2% 3 5 8 1% 8 16 24 4% 5 12 17 2% 5 1 6 1% 
Agriculture and Food 
40 12 52 4% 3 11 14 2% 10 14 24 3% 6 2 8 1% 16 6 22 4% 13 14 27 3% 2 9 11 2% 
Consumer Protection 
29 0 29 3% 0 2 2 0% 9 6 15 2% 1 0 1 0% 4 1 5 1% - - 
 
- 1 4 5 1% 
Citizens’ Rights 
59 15 74 6% 7 6 13 2% 26 11 37 4% 21 10 31 4% 17 18 35 6% 0 22 22 2% 7 12 19 3% 
Constitutional 
Questions and 
Functioning of EU 
29 25 54 5% 19 94 113 13% 5 51 56 6% 18 29 47 6% 12 74 86 14% 3 81 84 8% 12 41 53 9% 
Territorial questions 
20 34 54 5% 2 34 36 4% 7 52 59 6% 6 15 21 3% 2 27 29 5% 0 8 8 1% 58 83 141 25% 
Administration and 
bureaucracy 
(corruption) 
17 11 28 2% 6 29 35 4% 0 9 9 1% 12 53 65 8% 8 18 26 4% 4 3 7 1% 3 5 8 1% 
Total 673 487 1.160 157 699 856 257 675 932 331 506 837 156 445 601 204 876 1.080 193 368 561 
Source: Own data. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics of EU issue salience in the party and media agenda 
 
 AT FR DE GR NL PT UK 
Press releases (N) 673 157 257 331 156 204 193 
Mean (SD) 8.0 (6.5) 1.9 (2.2) 3.1 (2.9) 3.9 (3.1) 1.9 (1.9) 2.4 (2.3) 2.4 (2.1) 
Minimum, Maximum [0, 28] [0, 10] [0, 13] [0, 18] [0, 11] [0, 11] [0, 8] 
Political actors in 
media (N) 
487 699 675 506 445 876 368 
Mean (SD) 5.8 (4.9) 8.3 (6.8) 8.0 (6.3) 6.0 (5.9) 5.5 (4.4) 10.4 (6.9) 4.5 (3.9) 
Minimum, Maximum [0, 18] [0, 25] [0, 27] [0, 25] [0, 16] [0, 32] [0, 14] 
Source: Own data  
 
 
Appendix 2: CIRFs figures on the interdependencies between the party and media agenda 
 
Source: Own data. 
  
 
 
Appendix 3. Test statistics regarding identification of lag structure and main assumptions such as stationarity, stability and residual autocorrelation 
  Identification of lag structure Test of stationarity and stabilityb 
resid 
autocorrb 
County Lag AIC HQIC ADF PRs ADF media 
Eigenvalues 
inside unit 
circle 
Lagrange-
multiplier test 
Austria 2 12.223* 12.343* -6,392 -6,331 yes 3,697 
France 1 10.763* 10.835* -6,435 -4,914 yes 6,429 
Germany 1 11.276* 11.350* -5,551 -6,586 yes 3,706 
Germany (maxlag 14) 3 10.870* 11.072* -5,452 -4,742 yes 6,460 
Greece 1 11.354* 11.426* -5,856 -5,491 yes 5,302 
Netherlands 1 9.942* 10,015 -5,845 -5,589 yes 1,834 
Portugal 1 11.093* 11.165* -4,030 -5,387 yes 3,599 
UK 1 9.589* 9.662* -4,305 -5,923 yes 5,295 
Notes: ***=p<.001. **=p<.01. *=p<.05; 
aAugmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and Lagrange-multiplier tests indicates stationarity, non-unit-root, and no residual autocorrelation by confirming the null hypothesis (i.e., not being significant) 
Reading example for Austria: Two days are needed for changes of one variable to be reflected in the other, whereas AIC and HQIC are both significant at p<.05. ADF and Lagrange tests (testing remaining autocorrelation) are 
non-significant, stationarity and stability are given. Eigenvalues are inside the unit circle indicate non-unit-root, i.e., stability. 
Source: Own data.
 
 
 
1 The key words in the search string, here the English version, include Europ*, europ*, EU, EP, EC, ECB EIB ESM EFSF EFSM ECJ EEAS EESC 
EIF EDPS EMU Troika troika Frontex, and constitutional treaty. 
2 In line with other studies, we dropped issues related to “elections” and “other” (for the issue categories and codebook, see (Maier et al. 2016) as the 
former includes among others date of the election or technicalities rather than substantial discussions on EU issues, while the latter is a residual 
category (e.g., Hopmann et al. 2012). 
3The process is stationary “if its first and second moments [...] are independent of t. [...] Additionally, stationary of a VAR requires a stability 
condition that we test only after we estimate the VAR [via unit root checks]” (Becketti 2013: 313). 
4 We also check whether the data is stable, i.e., not affected by an underlying trend or impact of a third variable excluded in the model. Stability is 
achieved if the VAR has no unit root, i.e., all the eigenvalues are within the unit circle (for details, see Lütkepohl 2005: 15). 
5 The general rule of thumb is to start with four lags and add or decrease lags according to the information criteria and stability tests (i.e., whether 
there is residual autocorrelation or unit root left, Becketti 2013). Starting with a four-day lag structure and going up to fourteen days, we compared 
AIC and HQIC to decide on the optimal time lags. 
6 The VAR models presented in the next chapter are estimated using Stata (for an overview on relevant commands, see Abrigo and Love 2015 and 
Becketti 2013). 
7 The results are the same, even if only one actor per article is coded rather than up to three actors. 
8 The case of Austria displays high numbers of press releases due to specific institutional settings in party campaigning (see also, Kritzinger et al. 
2014: 328–29). 
9 These test statistics are satisfactory for all presented models, only in the Dutch model, the HQIC is not significant at lag 1. Thus, the results of the 
Dutch VAR should be interpreted with caution (see appendix 3).  
10 The inspection of the VAR coefficients in the model with the media agenda as dependent variable indicates that the coefficient relating to press 
releases lagged by one day is significant but not the two-day lagged coefficient. However, these regression coefficients should be interpreted 
carefully. Because of multicollinearity, for instance between the lags of the same variables, the coefficients might be biased (see also Vliegenthart and 
Montes 2014: 329). 
11Since identification procedure of the lag structure starts with the longest chosen lag, the test statistics are sensitive to the number of chosen lags 
(Becketti 2013: 306). When we start with four lags the AIC and HQIC propose a one-day lag. Yet, when increasing the number of lags to a maximum 
of fourteen, both information criteria suggest a three-day lag. 
                                                 
